November Meeting:
“Building an Objective Business:
The Philosophic
Framework”
In a world of Enron and WorldCom scandals, how can business leaders
reclaim their moral foundation and systemize those morals within their
organizations? GO member John Drake will address this question in his
presentation, “Building an Objective Business: The Philosophic
Framework,” at our November meeting. John will lead us in exploring the
fundamental principles of business, observing how Objectivism’s seven
virtues are systemized within today’s business systems, and examining
the process for acting purposefully in business.
Join us on Saturday, November 16, at 8 p.m. at the home of Joy &
Jeff Kiviat to learn more about the philosophy of business. Call (314)
469-2723 for directions.
Marsha Enright Speaking in Rolla
Marsha Enright will be speaking to the University of
Missouri-Rolla Objectivism Club on Thursday, Nov 14. Her talk, “The
Heroism in Self-Interest,” focuses on the fundamental importance of the
virtue of productivity and the use of reason. She then shows how the
United States has benefited from the social and political pursuit of
these values. The event is free and open to the public. For more info,
visit their website at http://web.umr.edu/~object/
or email bodson@umr.edu.
A Suggestion on How to Think About Iraq
By Jeff Kiviat
In response to President
Bush’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly, Ted Galen Carpenter
made an argument against preemption, which, I think, is flawed. He argues
that deterrence worked in the past, so why should we give up on it now. To
wit: “…even if Iraq is able someday to deploy a small arsenal, the
administration has yet to explain why the United States would be unable to
deter an attack.” He goes on to say, “The United States successfully
deterred the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin and his successors. We were
able to do so for decades, even though the USSR ultimately acquired
thousands of nuclear weapons. The United States also deterred China when
that country developed a nuclear weapons capability beginning in the
mid-1960’s.” So why can’t we deter Saddam? “The President and his
advisors cannot believe that Saddam is more brutal than the totalitarian
dictators the United States deterred in the past. Stalin and Mao…make
Saddam look like a rank amateur.” Further, he argues, we have deterred
Saddam in the past: “…[Saddam] refrained from using chemical weapons
against U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf War.”
Before getting to my main
argument, I would point out that he is making an analogy here. He is saying
that the situation today is similar to situations in the past when
deterrence worked. But he doesn’t justify the implicit claim of
similarity. He doesn’t, for instance, deal with the fact that Saddam is
Muslim. And as a Muslim, it is at least possible that he has views on death
similar to those of the homicide bombers. That would make him quite a bit
different than Stalin and Mao. Saddam also has at least some connection with
terrorists, who have already shown their willingness to strike at the United
States – another significant difference. To have his analogy taken
seriously, Carpenter would have to, at least, deal with these issues.
But now to the main point: we
did deter the USSR and China, but for most of that time we had no other
choice…they already had deliverable nuclear weapons. And though deterrence
worked, it might not have. Remember the Cuban Missile Crisis? That wasn’t
the only close call. Suppose we could have stopped them from getting nuclear
weapons at little cost, mightn’t we have been better off? My point is: you
have to look at the expected cost of action and non-action. To do that, you
multiply the probability of an outcome with the cost (or benefit) of that
outcome. For example, if there is even a 1% chance that Saddam will deliver
a nuclear weapon (by whatever means) to a major U.S. city with a cost of 2
million lives, the expected cost is 20,000 lives. Would the cost of
preemption be greater than that, or less? Now, I am not claiming that the
numbers I used are reliable; I don’t have the expertise to derive reliable
probabilities and costs. But I am saying that an important part of the
analysis has to involve making the best estimates possible for those
numbers. Loose analogies, as deployed by Carpenter, are not helpful in
arriving at the best answer to an admittedly difficult problem.
We welcome submissions of reviews, articles, columns and commentary.
Direct all correspondence to gwobjctvst@aol.com.
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